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By letter of 22 April 1976 the President of the Council of the European 
Communities requested the European Parliament, pursuant to Article 99 of 
the EEC Treaty, to deliver an opinion on the proposal from the Commission 
of the European Communities to the Council for a directive on mutual assistance 
by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct 
taxation. 
The President of the European Parliament referred this proposal to the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 10 May 1976. 
On 23 September 1976 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr de Broglie rapporteur. 
It considered this proposal at its meetings of 30 September and 
19 October 1976. 
At its meeting of 19 October 1976 the committee adopted the motion for 
a resolution by 7 votes to O with 3 abstentions. 
Present: Mr Van der Hek, chairman; Mr Cointat, vice-chairman; 
Mr de Broglie, rapporteur; Mr Artzinger, Mr Delmotte, Mr Glinne (deputizing 
for Mr Thornley), Mr Lange, Mr Prescott, Mr Starke and Mr Suck. 
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A 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament .an the proposal from to the council 
the Commission of the European Communitiei:y'relating to a directive concern-
ing mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in 
the field of direct taxation 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposal from the Commission of the European 
Communities to the Council1 ; 
- having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 99 of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC (Doc. 67/76); 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (Doc. 372/76); 
1. Notes that the tax evasion and avoidance practices which exploit the 
disparities between the tax laws of the Member States have seri01sly 
damaging repercussions internationally as well as within the Community, 
not only because of the budgetary losses that they entail, but also 
because they breach the principles of fair taxation and cause dis-
tortions in capital movements and conditions of competition; 
2. Approves, therefore, in line with the recommendation already made in 
the resolution of the European Parliament of 12 December 19742 , the 
principle of mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the 
Member States in the field of direct taxation; 
As regards the consultation procedure 
3. Fears that the essentially bilateral procedure provided for in Article 
9 might give rise to the application of different methods and hence to 
taxation disparities and distortions of competition within the Com-
munity, and considers it unsatisfactory in this respect that the 
Commission should be infonned only ex post facto (Article 9(3) ; 
l OJ No. C 94 of 27.4.1976, p. 2 
2 OJ No. C 5 of 8.1.1975, resolution, p.39, point 16 
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4. Notes that the proposed directive contains no details of the sanctions 
to be applied for unreasonable delays or an unsubstantiated refusal on 
the part of the authorities of a Member State to furnish the necessary 
information. 
As regards the limitations on_tho exchan~_of information 
5. Considers that, because of their vagueness, the two general limitations 
on the exchcl'lge of information between Member States, based on considera-
tions of public policy and the condition of reciprocity (Article 8 (2) 
and (3)), are unlikely to promote effective mutual assistance between 
the competent authorities of the Member States; 
6. While accepting that there is an evident need to ensure strict control 
of the disclosure of information gathered in this area, also invites the 
Commission, in this same connection, to submit a proposal for a regulation 
to provide at Community level for appeals against the assessment made 
by the authorities of a Member State of the confidential nature of tax 
information and its disclosure, in the interests both of the states 
requesting the information where it is unjustifiably withheld and of 
the taxpayer where it is used for irregular purposes; 
7. Approves, subject to these reservations, this proposal for a directive, 
which is the first measure designed to establish a mutual assistance pro-
cedure at Community level, made necessary by the inability of the national 
tax authorities to cope with the problem of international tax evasion and 
avoidance. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
This proposal for a directive follows on from the Council resolution of 
10 February 1975 on the measures to be taken by the Community in order to 
combat international tax evasion and avoidance. 
I. OBJECTIVE 
1. In its communication to the Council (Doc. COM(76) 1930), the Commission 
gives prominence to those of its proposals concerning the development of 
international assistance and cooperation relating to infonnation, supervision 
and recovery of tax. 
T~x evasion and avoidance practices which exploit the disparjties 
between the tax laws of tra Member States have serious damaging renercussions 
both at national and Community level; they result in budgetary losses, breach 
the principles of fair taxation and cause distortions in capital movc~ents 
and tho conditions of competition. 
If they are to be effective, measures to combat these practices must, 
of necessity, be organized on as wide an international basis as possible. 
2. The European Parliament fully approves the principle of mutual assistance 
by the competent authorities of the Member States, as set out in this proposal 
for a directive, whose scope is confined to questions of direct taxation1 • 
This initial measure forms part of an essential programme of action to regulate 
the activities of international firms. Its purpose is to establish at 
Community level taxation control machinery, made necessary by the inability 
of the national tax authorities to cope with the problem of international tax 
evasion and avoidance. 
Having endorsed the principle of the proposal, consideration must be 
given first Lo tho consultntion procedure for which it provides and then 
to the restrictions it imposes on its application. 
II. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PROCEDURE 
3. The mutual assistance procedure established by the proposal allows for 
different methods of consultation and for the setting up of consultation 
bodies. 
See Leenhardt report, Doc. 292/74, page 12, point 16 of explanatory 
statement. 
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(a) the different consultation methods 
Three types of consultation are proposed 
- exchan9e_on_reguest_(Article_2) 
This type of consultation relates to specific cases and may be rejected 
by the State from which the information is requested, if it appears that 
the requesting State has not exhausted its own usual sources of information. 
- automatic_exchan2e_(Article_9) 
Automatic exchange invariably relates to certain categories 0f information 
(dividends, royalties, frontier workers' pay), on which the competent 
authorities of the Member States have decided to hold consultationsby prior 
agreement under the consultation procedure set out in Article 9. 
- spontaneous_exchange_(Article_4) 
This Article deals with the compulsory transmission of information other 
than that provided on request or by prior agreement,in the five sets of 
circumstances set out in Article 4 (a) to (e) (abnormal reduction in or 
exemption from tax, improper exploitation of a double taxation agreement, 
tax savings resulting from artificial transfers of profits within groups 
of undertakings, etc.,). 
(b) consultation bodies 
4. For the purpose of determining the detailed rules governing the various 
consultation procedures and ensuring that the regulations are applied and 
interpreted in a uniform manner, the proposal for a directive stipulates that 
the consultalions arc to be held within a committee between the competent 
authorities of the two Member States concerned in the case of matters of 
bilateral interest. The results of such bilateral consultations on matters 
covered by the directive are to be transmitted·to the Commission which must 
in turn inform the competent authorities of the other Member States. Hence, 
the Commission and the other Member States are to be informed of arrangements 
made under these consultations - which are mainly based on bilateral relations 
- only when they are over. The danger of such a procedure is that it might 
result in differences of treatment and create new taxation disparities and 
distortions of competition within the Community, especially where the methods 
of exchanging information are those provided for in Articles 3 and 4. 
Both the obligation to inform the Commission provided for in Article 9(3) 
and the ~rocedure for pooling experience provided for in Article 10 seem 
inadequate to ensure that similar systems are established throughout the 
Community. 
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5. Finally, it should be noted that the information obtained following 
such consultations, particularly in connection with transfer pricing 
within groups of companies, might lead one Member State to adjust the tax-
able profits of a company without a corresponding adjustment being made by 
the other Member State. In view of this, the Commission was asked to submit 
to the Council by July 1976 at the latest a proposal for an ad hoe directive 
to deal with such cases of double taxation1 • 
III. LIMITATIONS 
6. As a first step, the present proposal provides that collaboration between 
administrations is to be carried out subject to the conditions and limitations 
of the legislation of each Member State. 
To assess the real scope of the proposal, it is therefore necessary to 
assess its limitations. 
These limitations stem as much from the sovereignty exercised by the 
Member States in matters of fiscal policy as from requirements regarding the 
observance of secrecy. 
(a) Limitations relating to the fiscal sovereignty of Member States 
7. It must be pointed out that there is no strict obligation on the Member 
States to hold consultations. In fact, the proposal contains no clause 
penalizing an unjustified refusal to divulge information: on the contrary, 
there are many exemptions to the obligation to provide information. 
The reasons to be given for refusing to comply with a request for in-
formation from a Member State is left entirely to the discretion of the 
~ember State to which the request is addressed. Thus, information may be 
refused ' ••• if it appears that the competent authority of the Member State 
making the request has not exhausted its own usual sources of information' 
(Article 2). 
Articles 3 and 4 contain no provision relating to a refusal to provide 
information and Article 5 specifies that if the authority called upon te> 
furnish information refuses to do so, it has merely to inform the requesting 
authority without delay, 'indicating the nature of the obstacles or the 
reasons for the refusal'. 
fo'inally, the oxchange of jnformation is subject to the two general 
limitations set out in Article 8, which are based on publ\c policy 
(Article 8 (2) and reciprocity (Article 8 (3)). 
1 Doc. 67/76, p.3, para.lo. 
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From an oxaminntion of these limitations, which are bound up with the 
fiscal sovereignty of the Member States, it would appoilr thal Lhu nxchiln~Jo 
of information is in far too many cases left to the sole discretion of the 
Member States,thereby substantially reducing the scope and effectiveness 
which we may legitimately expect from this proposal for a directive. 
A further criticism is that the cooperation procedure set out in 
Article 10 and relating to transfer pricing is extremely vague. 
(b) Secrecy 
8. Without disputing the need to safeguard the rights of taxpayers and to 
avoid indiscretions and improper disclosures in promoting such exchanges of 
information between the Member States, it may nevertheless be argued that 
the powers conferred by the proposal on the authorities of the Member States 
are excessive (ref. in particular the reciprocity rule laid down by Article 
7 (3)). The question that needs to be asked is whether, in the interests of 
fair taxation and of the taxpayer, the Member States should be recognized as 
enjoying sole discretion on the confidentiality of fiscal info:i:mation and its 
disclosure. 
Taken as a whole, these limitations detract considorably from Lho aco111• 
of the proposal, the result being that its effectiveness - an essential 
consideration in a measure designed to combat international tax evasion 
would seem in the last analysis to depend all too often on the 'goodwill' of 
the authorities of the Member States, which is to be regretted. 
• 
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